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In the modern federal administrative state, agencies enjoy judi-
cial deference to their reasonable interpretations of ambiguous stat-
utes and regulations.1  In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, Inc.,2 the Supreme Court held that an agency’s “permissible
construction” of an ambiguous statute is to be “given controlling
weight” so long as the construction is reasonable.3  Similarly, the
Supreme Court’s holding in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.4 gave
“controlling weight” to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its
own ambiguous regulation.5  Even though the doctrine of Chevron def-
erence is “functionally similar”6 to Seminole Rock deference, there is an
important structural difference between the two.  In both the Chevron
and Seminole Rock contexts, the agency serves as an interpreter of the
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, Class of 2014; Bachelor
of Arts, Georgetown University, Class of 2011.  I would like to thank my classmates on
the Notre Dame Law Review for their top-notch editing in preparing this Note for
publication.  All mistakes are my own.  I would also like to thank Professor Jeffrey
Pojanowski for his assistance in developing this topic, reading drafts, and providing
helpful commentary.  Finally, special thanks to my family and friends who have been a
great source of support throughout law school.
1 Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1449 (2011).
2 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3 Id. at 843–44.
4 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
5 Id. at 414.  A later Supreme Court decision, Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461
(1997), reaffirmed this principle of Seminole Rock deference.  For consistency, this
Note will refer to the doctrine as Seminole Rock deference.
6 John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpre-
tations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 613 (1996).
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ambiguous source of substantive law, be it a statute or regulation.7
The difference between Chevron deference and Seminole Rock defer-
ence is the process through which the ambiguous source of law comes
into effect. Chevron concerns an agency’s reasonable interpretation of
an ambiguous statute.8  Any ambiguity that exists is the product of the
legislative process: both houses of Congress passed a (potentially
ambiguous) bill and presented it to the President to be signed into
law.9  Even though the agency is responsible for clarifying any explicit
or implicit gap in the statute, Congress still drafted the statute.10
Conversely, agencies are responsible for drafting regulations.  In
most instances, when an agency is engaged in rulemaking under sec-
tion 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),11 the agency is
acting pursuant to some enabling organic statute that gives the agency
power to promulgate rules.12  The agency must publish “[g]eneral
notice of proposed rule making” in the Federal Register.13  The notice
must provide “a statement of the time, place, and nature of public
rule making proceedings,” reference to the organic statute under
which the agency is engaging in rulemaking, and “either the terms or
substance” of the agency’s proposed rule or a description of the sub-
7 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (“Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” (emphasis added)); Seminole
Rock, 325 U.S. at 414 (“[T]he administrative interpretation . . . becomes of controlling
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” (emphasis
added)).
8 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
9 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House
of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
President of the United States . . . .”).
10 Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) (noting that an agency must “fill any
gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress”).  The Chevron Court relied on this pro-
position in reasoning to its holding. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
11 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).  Section 553 also contains language that describes the
circumstances when an agency must go through formal rulemaking procedures. Id.
§ 553(c) (“When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after oppor-
tunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply . . . .”).  The
Supreme Court, however, has adopted a jurisprudence that is lenient towards an
agency’s decision to engage in “informal rulemaking” under § 553. See United States
v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 238 (1973) (holding that phrase “after hearing”
did not trigger §§ 556–57 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)).
12 “Agencies spend a great deal of time responding to statutory directives from
Congress.”  Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L.
REV. 112, 118 (2011); see also id. at 116 (stating that, when the agency issues a legisla-
tive rule “as a delegate of Congress,” the regulation carries the same force of law as a
statute).
13 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
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ject of the proposed rulemaking.14  In addition to this notice require-
ment, an agency must also provide the public with “an opportunity to
participate,” and “[a]fter consideration of the relevant matter
presented,” must provide a “concise general statement of their basis
and purpose” with the promulgated rule.15  Congress’s only involve-
ment in this rulemaking process is passing the statute which gives the
agency authority to promulgate rules; any ambiguity in the regulation
is the result of agency draftsmanship.16
This is the important distinction between Chevron deference and
Seminole Rock deference: an agency serves as both the drafter and
interpreter of ambiguous regulations in Seminole Rock.17  The unity of
drafter and interpreter raises a number of concerns about separation
of powers,18 the procedural safeguards of the APA,19 and the incen-
tives of ambiguous rulemaking.20  At the same time, this dual role
gives the agency special insight into the intent of the regulation.21  In
a recent article, Matthew Stephenson and Miri Pogoriler proposed a
number of possible limitations to Seminole Rock deference, such as
withholding deference from “placeholder” interpretations,22 interpre-
tations that create retroactivity problems,23 and interpretations follow-
ing more informal procedures.24  Stephenson and Pogoriler argue
that these limitations are effective means of overcoming the problems
that uniquely arise from Seminole Rock deference.25  These doctrinal
limits follow from Seminole Rock’s similarity to Chevron.26  Much less
14 Id. § 553(b)(1)–(3).
15 Id. § 553(c).
16 Cf. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (recognizing the Secretary of
Labor’s interpretation of the salary basis test to be controlling because the test “is a
creature of the Secretary’s own regulations”).
17 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1460 (“Seminole Rock deference also
raises distinctive concerns that do not apply . . . in the Chevron context.”).
18 Manning, supra note 6, at 640 (“Seminole Rock ignores another critical struc-
tural feature of the Constitution—the separation of powers.”).
19 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1461.
20 Id.
21 See Gose v. U.S. Postal Serv., 451 F.3d 831, 837 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“We defer
even more broadly to an agency’s interpretations of its own regulations than to its
interpretation of statutes, because the agency, as the promulgator of the regulation, is
particularly well suited to speak to its original intent in adopting the regulation.”).
22 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1466–71.
23 Id. at 1481.
24 Id. at 1496.
25 Id. at 1459.
26 This is the pragmatic rationale for Seminole Rock deference: “a pragmatic con-
cern about institutional competence, coupled with a legal fiction about implied con-
gressional delegation.” Id. at 1458.
912 notre dame law review [vol. 89:2
attention is paid to potential limitations based upon the fact that the
agency enjoys special insight into the meaning of its own
regulations.27
This Note offers some additional thoughts on the outer limits of
Seminole Rock deference.  Part I discusses the three concerns associated
with unchecked Seminole Rock deference that comprise the self-delega-
tion problem—violation of constitutional norms, exploitation of a
statutory loophole, and perverse incentives.  It explores the potential
for abuse they create and recommends what the limitations should
look like in order to avoid this potential.28  Part II explains the two
rationales for Seminole Rock deference: the pragmatic and originalist
rationales.  It describes how the two rationales relate to each other,
explains how courts use pragmatic and originalist arguments in their
opinions, and recommends a new way to think about the two ratio-
nales in light of these considerations.29  Part III traces the boundaries
of Seminole Rock deference while taking into account how both ratio-
nales justify judicial deference to an agency’s reasonable interpreta-
tion of its own regulation.  This Note will indicate which of
Stephenson and Pogoriler’s proposed limitations are strengthened by
considering the originalist rationale30 and which of Stephenson and
Pogoriler’s proposed limitations are unaffected by considering the
originalist rationale.31  Finally, this Note will argue for the adoption of
a limitation that flows from the originalist rationale: a consistency
limitation.32
I. THE SELF-DELEGATION PROBLEM
Deference under Seminole Rock creates a problem that has no ana-
log in the Chevron context: if an agency knows it will receive deference
for its own interpretation of a regulation, it can “delegate” to itself the
27 This is the basic articulation of the originalist rationale for Seminole Rock defer-
ence, which Stephenson and Pogoriler argue is not as important to the doctrine as
the pragmatic rationale. Id. at 1457 (“Moreover, many of the conclusions about Semi-
nole Rock’s domain that would seem to flow naturally from the originalist rationale—
including the notion that interpretations issued long after the regulation should
receive less deference—are routinely dismissed by courts as irrelevant.”).  However,
“[t]he death of the originalist rationale should not be exaggerated, as originalist rea-
soning does sometimes appear in modern cases.” Id. at 1457–58.  Both rationales will
be discussed in more detail below. See infra Part II.
28 See infra Part I.
29 See infra Part II.
30 See infra Section III.A.
31 See infra Section III.B.
32 See infra Section III.C.
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power to clarify a regulation at a later time.33  Conversely, when Con-
gress drafts legislation, it cannot empower itself to control how the
statute is interpreted or enforced.34  Nor can Congress “reinterpret” a
statute that has been enacted into law unless it passes another statute
to modify the previous statutory language.35  Therefore, Chevron def-
erence does not have the “self-delegation” problem that Seminole Rock
deference does.  This raises a number of concerns about Seminole
Rock’s broad application.36  Unbridled Seminole Rock deference, which
empowers an agency to self-delegate, contravenes separation of pow-
ers norms, exploits a loophole within the Administrative Procedure
Act,37 and incentivizes behavior that is detrimental to good
governance.
First, separation of powers was one of the most important norms
embodied within the Constitution.  As James Madison stated in The
Federalist Papers:
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value or is stamped
with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty than [sep-
aration of powers].  The accumulation of all powers legislative, exec-
utive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or
many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.38
To prevent the consolidation of powers within a single entity, the
drafters of the Constitution vested distinct powers among the coordi-
nate branches of government.39  The Constitution also contemplates
certain circumstances where a branch appears to act in a way which
crosses the lines drawn by the Vesting Clauses; these instances are tex-
tually-prescribed checks that functionally blend the powers of the fed-
eral government.  For instance, the President is given the power to
33 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1464.
34 Cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (holding that congressional
control over an official entrusted with executing the law is unconstitutional).
35 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 (1983) (holding that the legislative veto
violated the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses of the Constitution).
36 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1459–66.
37 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706, 1305, 3105, 3344,
4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2006).
38 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 244 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982), cited in
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives.”); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America.”); id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).
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veto legislation under Article I.40  Because this veto can only be over-
come by a two-thirds vote in each house, the presidential veto is func-
tionally equivalent to a one-third vote in each house of Congress.41
Thus, the structure of the Constitution reflects the Founders’ intent to
create strict boundaries between the branches of government because
of the fear of the consolidation of power.42
Agencies are capable of exercising all three powers recognized in
the Vesting Clauses,43 although agency actions are usually subject to
an independent check from the non-executive branches.44  Even
though legislative and enforcement powers are combined within
agency rulemaking, the principle of separation of powers is main-
tained because agency action is subject to judicial review.45  Where a
reviewing court defers to the agency’s interpretation of a statute
under Chevron, the separation of powers norm persists because of
“step one” in the Chevron analysis: if Congress has clearly and directly
spoken on the issue within the statute, then Congress, not the agency,
controls the interpretation.46  In both instances, a separate branch of
government maintains a check over agency action.  However, Seminole
Rock deference retains neither the judicial nor legislative check: in the
Seminole Rock context, the agency—not Congress—makes the law, and
40 Id. art. I, § 7.
41 Manning, supra note 6, at 641 n.148.
42 See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 38, at 244.
43 Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Ques-
tions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492–93 (1987) (“These agen-
cies adopt rules having the shape and impact of statutes, mold governmental policy
through enforcement decisions and other initiatives, and decide cases in ways that
determine the rights of private parties.”).
44 Beyond the fact that the legislative branch controls agencies through appropri-
ations, see GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 114–15 (5th ed. 2009), the fact
that legislative delegation of authority is a prerequisite for Chevron deference can be
seen as a limitation on agencies.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229
(2001) (“[Courts] have recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chev-
ron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of
rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference
is claimed.”).  Additionally, the APA contains express language that permits judicial
review of agency action.  5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (“To the extent necessary to decision
and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action.”).
45 See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
46 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court,
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.”).
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the agency—not the Court—controls the interpretation of the law.47
The idea that a single government entity is responsible for both draft-
ing and interpreting a source of substantive law would be abhorrent to
the Founding Fathers.
Second, Stephenson and Pogoriler identified a separate facet of
the self-delegation problem concerning the lack of notice and com-
ment procedures applicable to an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation.  As discussed above, agency rulemaking is typically subject
to a number of procedural constraints—namely, the requirement of
providing notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity to com-
ment.48  Interpretive rules, however, are not subject to APA procedu-
ral safeguards.49  Typically, a court will show an agency less deference
under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. when working through less procedurally
rigorous avenues.50  As Stephenson and Pogoriler observe:
In the statutory interpretation context, agencies have a choice: they
can use notice-and-comment proceedings to promulgate their statu-
tory interpretations as legislative rules, in which case they will pre-
sumptively receive Chevron deference, or they can opt to issue these
interpretations informally as interpretive rules, in which case they
47 Manning, supra note 6, at 639.
48 See supra notes 11–15.
49 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (“[T]his subsection does not apply—to interpretive rules,
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice.”).
50 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  Under Skidmore, a reviewing
court does not consider the agency interpretation controlling. Id. at 140.  Rather, the
court will look to the agency interpretation as “guidance,” with the degree of its per-
suasiveness being based upon “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give [the agency] power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”
Id.  However, Skidmore was a pre-Chevron case, and its utility post-Chevron has been
called into question.  In his dissent in United States v. Mead Corp., Justice Scalia
objected to the “resurrect[ion]” of “the pre-Chevron doctrine of Skidmore deference.”
533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia argued that the major-
ity’s holding changed Chevron from a bright-line test into one that balances the “total-
ity of the circumstances.” Id.  Justice Scalia also noted that Skidmore “does not, like
Chevron, leave the matter within the control of the Executive Branch for the future”
because the agency would not be free to take a position contrary to the court at a later
time as it would under Chevron. Id. at 247.  Finally, Justice Scalia noted that the
“anachronistic” Skidmore standard is out of place in an era when administrative law is
“pervasive,” and that it is an “empty truism . . . [that a] judge should take into account
the well-considered views of expert observers.” Id. at 250.  Despite these protestations,
the majority opinion held that “Chevron left Skidmore intact” and the less deferential
standard is still good law today. Id. at 237 (majority opinion).
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will have to defend their interpretations under the less deferential
Skidmore standard.51
Under Seminole Rock, however, the agency’s interpretation of its
own regulation receives deference from a reviewing court,52 creating
the following loophole within the APA: “Even if the legislative rule has
to go through notice and comment, the agency could deliberately
draft this legislative rule broadly and vaguely, and then later resolve all
the controversial points by issuing interpretive rules.”53
This loophole creates the opportunity for bad governance.  Con-
gress delegates authority to agencies because of their technical exper-
tise that assists in policymaking decisions.54  When an agency
circumvents the procedures for notice and comment rulemaking, it
also circumvents the steps of the rulemaking process that positively
affect the substance of the agency’s decision.55  The loophole also has
the potential to negatively impact the judicial branch.  If an agency
disguised all of its policymaking as interpretation for purposes of
obtaining Seminole Rock deference, a court would not be able to prop-
erly engage in thorough judicial review of the agency action as it
would when undertaking arbitrary and capricious review.56  This
undermines a reviewing court’s “duty . . . to say what the law is.”57
51 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1464.
52 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
53 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1464.
54 See Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991); see also JAMES M.
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 154 (1938) (“Government today no longer
dares to rely for its administration upon the casual office-seeker.  Into its service it
now seeks to bring men of professional attainment in various fields and to make that
service such that they will envisage governance as a career.”). But see Thomas W.
Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1059–67
(1997) (describing the negative and skeptical views of agencies typical of the “capture
theory” era of administrative law).
55 See Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 856, 864 (2007).  Increased procedures can improve the quality of
rulemaking through “ventilation” of important issues, id. at n.55, and by allowing
adversarial public scrutiny to refine the rulemaking process. Id. at 900.
56 Judicial review of agency policymaking—as opposed to legal conclusions—is
governed by the arbitrary and capricious standard.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).  To
survive hard look review, an agency must show they considered relevant factors under
the statute. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).  The agency must examine relevant data and give an
adequate explanation with rational connection between facts found and choice made,
id., and at the very least, the agency path may be reasonably discerned, even if the
decision is not one of ideal clarity. Id.
57 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Chevron and Seminole
Rock deference square with Marbury through the application of a legal fiction about
legislative intent.  Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1450.  For example, in the
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Finally, this loophole harms the public.  Under the APA, the public
has the opportunity to be heard when an agency engages in rulemak-
ing, and those who are affected by an agency’s action have the right to
challenge the action’s merits in court.58  An agency’s use of this loop-
hole denies the public a chance to affect the agency’s policymaking at
its inception and severely curtails the ability to obtain meaningful judi-
cial review of the interpretation.
Finally, unchecked Seminole Rock deference incentivizes behavior
detrimental to good governance.  Creating incentives for agencies to
self-delegate compounds the problems associated with separation of
powers concerns and the loophole to the procedural safeguards of the
APA.  As Stephenson and Pogoriler observed, deference incentivizes
agencies to promulgate ambiguous rules and interpret the rules at a
later time.59 Chevron deference encourages Congress to promulgate
clearer statutes because an agency will have the opportunity to resolve
the statute’s meaning if Congress fails to do so.60  Conversely, when an
agency drafts the regulation that needs interpretation, this division is
not present.  Therefore, an agency is free to enact an ambiguous regu-
lation with full knowledge that it retains institutional control over the
interpretation of the source of law,61 which, in turn, may receive even
greater deference from the courts than other agency action would.62
Chevron context, ambiguity in a statute is interpreted as Congress having no intent
except to leave it to the agency to resolve.  Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Adminis-
trative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516.
58 See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 110 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
59 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1461.
60 See Manning, supra note 6, at 654 (“If Congress omits to specify its policies
clearly during the process of bicameralism and presentment, it does so only at the
price of forfeiting its power of policy specification to a separate expositor beyond its
immediate control.”); see also supra notes 34–35 (citing case law that prohibits Con-
gress’s involvement in the execution of the law); Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note
1, at 1461 (articulating why the competitive nature of the relationship between the
legislative and executive branches incentivizes Congress to write clear statutes so as to
prevent political rivals from determining the statute’s meaning).
61 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1461.
62 Compare Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)
(“[T]he ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of con-
trolling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”),
with 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006) (“The reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”). But see Robert A.
Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It, 10 ADMIN L.J
AM. U. 1, 25 (1996) (suggesting there is no difference between review under
§ 706(2)(A) and the reasonableness inquiry at Chevron step two).
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Unlimited Seminole Rock deference likely incentivizes the types of
actions that an agency chooses to engage in.  If an agency is faced with
ambiguity in one of its regulations, it has two options to correct the
ambiguity: it can either amend the regulation through its rulemaking
procedures, or it can issue an interpretive rule that modifies how the
agency will choose to interpret the regulation.63  As discussed above,
the APA does not prescribe the same procedural safeguards for inter-
pretive rules as it does for rulemaking.64  Therefore, it is much easier
in terms of time and resources to issue a new interpretation than it is
for the agency to modify the regulation via notice and comment
rulemaking.65  The fact that courts show more deference to agency
actions subject to more, rather than less, procedure typically mitigates
this choice.66  But if a reviewing court defers to an agency’s interpreta-
tion so long as it is reasonable, as in the Seminole Rock context, then
the agency will choose to act through less procedurally rigorous
channels.67
In short, when courts apply Seminole Rock deference categorically
to any agency interpretation, it creates very real problems when agen-
cies engage in substantive policymaking under the guise of mere inter-
pretation.  The separation of powers concern is present in Seminole
Rock deference but not Chevron deference because, in the Seminole
63 Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 12, at 117 (explaining how interpretive rules
can create “a change in the legal norm” even though they do not purport to “make
positive law” (quoting Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997))).
64 See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
65 See Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he agency would be
stymied in its enforcement duties if every time it brought a case on a new theory it had
to pause for . . . notice and comment rulemaking.”).
66 See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility,
Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 528, 552 (2006).
67 See Manning, supra note 6, at 655.  An analogy to United States v. Florida East
Coast Railway is also helpful.  Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, every actor
involved, from the Interstate Commerce Commission to the regulated railroads,
thought that the organic statute required the Commission to set rates through formal
rulemaking. LAWSON, supra note 44, at 208–18.  The Supreme Court held, however,
that the “after hearing” language in the organic statute was not the same as the
requirement that a rule be made “on the record after opportunity for an agency hear-
ing” in § 553(c) of the APA.  United States v. Fla E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 234
(1973).  In the wake of this decision, agencies do most of their rulemaking through
the more informal notice and comment process contained in § 553. LAWSON, supra
note 44, at 229 (“Indeed, since [Florida East Coast Railroad] was decided, no statute
that does not contain the magic words ‘on the record’ has been found to require
formal rulemaking.  Apart from the few rulemaking statutes that contain an express
‘on the record’ requirement, formal rulemaking has virtually disappeared as a proce-
dural category.”).
2013] an  agency’s  special  insight 919
Rock context, the interpreter also drafts the law that must be inter-
preted.68  The loophole contained within the APA is exploited when
the agency relies on its interpretive powers, rather than its rulemaking
powers, to make substantive decisions.69  The deleterious incentives
encourage the misuse of interpretive power.70  In seeking to mitigate
these problems, the limitations to Seminole Rock deference should be
designed to reward the agency for responsibly choosing to use its
rulemaking procedures in promulgating new policy.  These limita-
tions can be grounded in one of the two rationales courts have used to
justify Seminole Rock deference.
II. RATIONALES FOR SEMINOLE ROCK DEFERENCE REVISITED
The pragmatic rationale for Seminole Rock deference focuses on
four inherent advantages that administrative agencies have as policy-
makers over the other two branches of government.71  Agencies make
superior policymakers because they possess a greater capacity to
develop technical expertise, can change policy in a more efficient
manner, have the institutional flexibility to enact policy in a number
of different ways, and are more politically accountable to the electo-
rate and its policy preferences.
Agencies can develop technical expertise more effectively than
generalist federal judges due to their superior command over their
subject matter as a specialized administrative agency.72  Whereas fed-
eral agencies may be devoted to a special field (e.g., the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration and workplace safety), federal dock-
ets contain a diverse array of cases—often in onerous quantities.73
68 See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text.
69 See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 59–67 and accompanying text.
71 See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION & REGULATION
379–84 (2010) (Legislature); Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1459–60
(Judiciary).
72 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1459.
73 In 2012, there were a total of 370,246 cases pending across the dockets of all
federal district judges over the course of a twelve-month period, or about 547 per
federal district judge. Federal Court Management Statistics, December 2012, ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalCourtManagement
Statistics/district-courts-december-2012.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2013).  This
includes both civil and criminal cases, the latter of which need to be addressed in a
timely manner to afford criminal defendants their constitutional protections. See U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.  Federal courts simply do not have the luxury that agencies do to
contemplate complex regulatory issues. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 862 (2001) (“The extraordinary complexity of
much of federal statutory law may mean that the goal of resolving statutory ambigui-
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Similarly, agencies can develop expertise in a large and variable num-
ber of subject matters at a level of specificity that Congress cannot
attain.74  Compared to Congress, agencies can more easily be filled
with policy experts and can directly translate policy into law without
institutional hurdles.75
Interpreting an ambiguous regulation is the most efficient way
for an agency to resolve ambiguity.  An agency does not need to
adhere to the same procedural hurdles that it must when it is engaged
in rulemaking and adjudication.76  Even with informal rulemaking, an
agency must provide notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportu-
nity to comment.77  An agency must go through additional steps if the
organic statute requires the agency to engage in formal rulemaking.78
Similarly, all parties affected by formal adjudications are entitled to
timely notice.79  But regardless of how the agency chooses to act, it will
act much more efficiently than legislation.  Delegating power to an
administrative agency is an effective method for overcoming the obsta-
cles Congress typically faces in the legislative process.80
ties in such a way as to further the purposes of the statute is increasingly becoming a
task beyond the grasp of generalist judges.”).
74 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) (noting that one of the reasons Congress may delegate authority to an agency
is Congress’s recognition that “those with great expertise” in a field would be better
suited to address certain policy issues); see also MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 71,
at 381 (arguing the administrative process is superior to the legislative process at
effectively using information to form policy).
75 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 568 (2009).  While
legislative committees may allow individual congressmen to develop some technical
expertise, the mechanics of the legislative process make it more difficult for that
expertise to translate into policy outcomes. Id. at 567 (quoting David Epstein &
Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A Political
Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 967 (1998)).  Specifically, committee pro-
posals “must first pass through the floor, which may decide to make some alterations
to the committee’s proposals.”  Epstein & O’Halloran, supra, at 967.  While this may
“give[ ] committees less incentive to gather information in the first place,” agencies
“are not hampered by the need to obtain congressional approval” before their exper-
tise can become law. Id.
76 Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996).
77 See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text.
78 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (allowing informal rulemaking “[e]xcept when notice or
hearing is required by statute”).
79 See 5 U.S.C. § 554.
80 Congress faces numerous obstacles in passing legislation that make the process
cumbersome for developing expertise.  Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution
requires every bill to go through both houses before being presented to the President.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.  These constitutional checks and balances serve to “block legis-
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This efficiency also comes with flexibility.  As described above, an
agency has a number of different avenues for enacting policy.81  In
contrast, legislation can only pass through bicameralism and present-
ment.82  This allows agencies to adapt to unforeseen issues as they
arise through interpretive rules.  “Experience is often the best
teacher, and agencies retain a substantial measure of freedom to
refine, reformulate, and even reverse their precedents in the light of
new insights and changed circumstances.”83
Agencies are also politically accountable.  While the President
appoints both federal judges and administrative officers, the former
enjoy life tenure after appointment and never have to run for reelec-
tion to defend their office.84  Conversely, agencies are indirectly
accountable to voters through presidential elections, so certain agency
positions change with presidential elections.85  This indirect political
accountability makes agencies a more “democratic” institution than
the federal courts.86  Furthermore, Congress exerts more oversight
lative initiatives” that might otherwise prove to be sound policy. MANNING & STEPHEN-
SON, supra note 71, at 24–25.
81 See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.
82 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955–56 (1983) (“[W]e see that when the
Framers intended to authorize either House of Congress to act alone and outside of
its prescribed bicameral legislative role, they narrowly and precisely defined the pro-
cedure for such action . . . . [W]hen the Draftsmen sought to confer special powers on
one House, independent of the other House, or of the President, they did so in
explicit, unambiguous terms.”).
83 Davila-Bardales v. INS, 27 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1994).
84 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 397 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Garry Willis, ed., 1982) (“If then the courts of justice are to be considered
as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this con-
sideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices
. . . .”).
85 MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 71, at 383; cf. Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial
Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 312 (1986) (“Unelected judges
should leave the executive branch free to pursue, within appropriate bounds, what it
perceives to be the will of the people.”).
86 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Deci-
sions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 94–99 (1985).  The argument that agencies are more
responsive to the will of the electorate hinges on the connection between voters and
administrative agencies through the President. Id. at 94.  Every four years, a new pres-
idential administration is elected based upon the positions that the candidate takes
during the election. Id. at 95.  With this electoral mandate, the new administration
comes into power and is expected to enact its policies through its various executive
officers. Id. at 96 (“Indeed, one can reasonably expect that a president will be able to
affect policy in a four-year term only because being elected president entails acquiring
the power to exercise, direct, or influence policy discretion [through agencies].”).  If
new administrations did not have flexibility to pursue their policy directives because
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over agencies than federal judges.87  Judges generally are not haled
before congressional committees to be interrogated about their deci-
sions with their budgets at stake.  Agencies are also more accountable
to the public to the extent the APA mandates procedures that facili-
tate public participation in agency decision making.88  There is no
analogous law that requires judges and Congressmen to allow citizens
to participate in a bench trial or a congressional vote.89  Furthermore,
no law requires congressmen to issue a formal announcement
explaining why they voted for or against a bill.
Courts that invoke the pragmatic rationale for Seminole Rock def-
erence allude to these four advantages of agencies: expertise, effi-
ciency, flexibility, and accountability.90  For instance, in Thomas
Jefferson University Hospital v. Shalala,91 hospitals were permitted to
request reimbursement for the “net cost” of graduate medical educa-
tion (GME) programs.92  Net costs were to be calculated “by deduct-
ing, from a provider’s total costs of these activities, revenues it receives
from tuition.”93  When the University sought reimbursement for previ-
statutes always mandated the proper course of action, then presidential elections
“would be a mere beauty contest.” Id.  In short, agencies are expected to be respon-
sive to voters.
87 MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 71, at 475–76 (describing congressional
oversight as a way Congress can exercise control over agency behavior).
88 While judges enjoy life tenure, see supra note 84 and accompanying text, Con-
gressmen and Senators must defend their seat every two or six years. U.S. CONST. art.
1, §§ 2–3; id. amend. XVII, cl. 1.  This Note is not arguing that legislative officers are
not politically accountable.  Constituents are able to express their opinions on various
topics to their representatives and are certainly free to elect a new representative dur-
ing elections.  Rather, this Note argues that agencies are politically accountable
because their rulemaking procedures are required by law to permit public participa-
tion, see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006), whereas there is no comparable law that, for example,
requires floor time to any interested citizen to express his views on a bill.
89 To be sure, there is room for limited layperson participation in the judicial and
legislative process.  Juries are “selected at random from a fair cross section of the
community in the district or division wherein the court convenes.”  28 U.S.C. § 1861
(2006).  Constituents may petition their Congressman or Senator to advocate that a
certain bill should be adopted.  But nothing guarantees that a specific person must be
selected to a jury or that the congressman must hear the constituent’s opinion.  By
contrast, the APA guarantees certain rights of public participation in the administra-
tive process. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1) (requiring that the general notice of pro-
posed rulemaking include “a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule
making proceedings” (emphasis added)); 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (“[T]he agency shall give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making [process] . . . .”).
90 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1460.
91 512 U.S. 504 (1994).
92 Id. at 507.
93 42 C.F.R. § 413.85(g) (1993).
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ously unclaimed GME costs, the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices upheld the initial denial.94  Citing language from 42 C.F.R.
§ 413.85(c),95 the Secretary concluded that the non-salary GME costs
would be “impermissible” as a redistribution of costs from the educa-
tional to the patient care unit of the University.96  In deferring to the
Secretary’s interpretation of the “anti-redistribution clause,” the
majority prefaced its argument with an indication that deference to
the agency’s interpretation is “all the more warranted” because the
regulation in question involved “a complex and highly technical regu-
latory program” that “require[d] significant expertise” in administer-
ing the program.97
Thomas Jefferson is an illustrative example of how reviewing courts
will invoke a pragmatic reason for deferring to an agency’s reasonable
interpretation of its own regulation.  Other Supreme Court and fed-
eral courts of appeals cases justify Seminole Rock deference using simi-
lar pragmatic language.98  Each of these arguments for why courts
should defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation can be raised
in the context of Chevron.99  Missing from an agency’s interpretation
94 Thomas Jefferson, 512 U.S. at 510–12.
95 The regulation provides in full:
Although the intent of the program is to share in the support of educational
activities customarily or traditionally carried on by providers in conjunction
with their operations, it is not intended that this program should participate
in increased costs resulting from redistribution of costs from educational institu-
tions or units to patient care institutions or units.
42 C.F.R. § 413.85(c) (emphasis added).
96 Thomas Jefferson, 512 U.S. at 510–11.
97 Id. at 511–12 (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697
(1991)) (internal quotations omitted).
98 See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal v Aracoma Coal, 556 F.3d 177, 201 (4th Cir. 2009)
(“In matters involving complex predictions based on special expertise, ‘a reviewing
court must generally be at its most deferential.’” (quoting Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983))); Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp. v.
Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 117 F.3d 596, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (giving deference to
agency’s own interpretation); Pac. Coast Med. Enters. v. Harris, 633 F.2d 123, 131
(9th Cir. 1980) (same); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 578 F.2d
289, 292 (10th Cir. 1978) (same); see also Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l. Hosp., 514 U.S.
87, 96 (1996) (noting the flexibility the Secretary enjoys under the APA); Hoctor v.
USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1996) (arguing that notice and comment rulemak-
ing is an inefficient way to resolve inevitable ambiguity that appears in statutes).
99 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984) (“Perhaps [Congress] consciously desired the Administrator to strike the
balance at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with respon-
sibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so . . . .”);
see also id. at 866 (“‘Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political
branches.’” (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978))); Cass R. Sunstein, Law
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of a statute, however, is that the agency does not possess “special
insight” into the original intent of the drafter.100  In the Chevron con-
text, the drafter of the ambiguous source of law is located in a sepa-
rate branch of government from the interpreter: Congress is separate
from the executive branch.  In the Seminole Rock context, the drafter
and the interpreter are located within the same branch of government
and, in most cases, within the same agency.101
This “duality” of legislative and interpretive power is not lost on
courts.102  Courts invoke the originalist rationale when invoking the
agency’s dual role as drafter and interpreter as a reason why courts
should defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own regu-
lation.  The typical originalist argument emphasizes the fact that the
agency that wrote a regulation has “special insight” into the “original
intent” of the regulation, and that the original intent of the regulation
should control its interpretation.103  Courts following this reasoning
will defer to an agency’s interpretation when the court determines
that the interpretation reflects the agency’s “special insight” into the
regulation’s meaning—such as when the agency’s interpretation is
made shortly after the regulation is promulgated, or when the inter-
pretation represents a consistently held view of the agency.104  The
originalist rationale, however, has not been as robustly explored by
the courts as the pragmatic rationale has.105  As noted by Scott H.
Angstreich, Udall v. Tallman106 was the first instance that the Supreme
Court offered this type of explanation.107  The Udall Court stated “def-
and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2089 & nn.87–88 (1990)
(arguing that “a degree of flexibility” is “quite healthy” because it allows agencies to
apply broad statutes in a “wide variety of contexts” as opposed to being bound by
overly specific statutes).
100 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1453.
101 See Manning, supra note 6, at 639.
102 Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 12, at 121.
103 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1454.
104 See id.  Stephenson and Pogoriler indicate that Seminole Rock deference may be
inappropriate for inconsistent interpretations for two reasons.  First, deference may
be inappropriate because the new, inconsistent interpretation does not provide
insight into the regulation. Id at 1455. Second, deference may be inappropriate
because inconsistency implies that the agency never had a clear understanding of the
regulation’s meaning. Id.
105 See, e.g., F. Uri & Co. v. Bowles, 152 F.2d 713, 718 (9th Cir. 1945) (citing to
Seminole Rock after providing a perfunctory statement declaring that interpretations
concurrently issued with regulations “determine the meaning of the words of the
statute”).
106 380 U.S. 1 (1964).
107 Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock Deference
to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 93 (2000).
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erence is even more clearly in order” when the construction in ques-
tion is a regulation that the interpreting agency is responsible for
administering.108  Some courts have even suggested this reasoning
compels stronger deference in the Seminole Rock context than in the
Chevron context.109  Many courts, however, have explicitly rejected
originalist reasoning.110  This fact, coupled with the often conclusory
reasoning used by courts invoking the originalist rationale,111 suggests
that the pragmatic rationale is the “dominant modern account of Sem-
inole Rock deference.”112
But courts still acknowledge that the originalist rationale is sound
reasoning for why an agency interpretation is entitled to Seminole Rock
deference.113 Bruh v. Bessemer Venture Partners is especially illustrative.
The Bruh court first justified Seminole Rock deference by analogizing to
Chevron: “Like the deference owed under Chevron . . . to an agency’s
reasonable construction of a statute it administers, Seminole Rock defer-
ence is justified both by the agency’s special expertise in the subject
108 Udall, 380 U.S. at 16.
109 Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Intern. Trade Comm’n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1363–64
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is
broader than deference to the agency’s construction of a statute, because in the latter
case the agency is addressing Congress’s intentions, while in the former it is address-
ing its own.”); accord Gose v. U.S. Postal Serv., 451 F.3d 831, 837 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
Office of Workers’ Comp., U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 54 F.3d
141, 147 (3d Cir. 1995).
110 In Paragon Health Network, Inc. v. Thompson, 251 F.3d 1141 (7th Cir. 2001), the
court affirmed the pragmatic rationale: “The rationale for Seminole Rock deference is
similar to that for [Chevron].” Id. at 1146.  Simultaneously, the court rejected original-
ist reasoning, stating “no demonstration that the agency officials had special insight
into the intentions behind the passage of the regulation is required.” Id. at 1147; see
also United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 566 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting
that, when drafters do not consider an issue, judges will look elsewhere for the
meaning).
111 Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 939 (1986) (citing to Udall for the “established
proposition that an agency’s construction of its own regulations is entitled to substan-
tial deference” without further explanation); F. Uri & Co. v. Bowles, 152 F.2d 713, 718
(9th Cir. 1945).
112 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1458 (noting that courts are more
likely to justify Seminole Rock deference on pragmatic rather than originalist grounds).
113 See Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144,
151 (1991) (“[W]e presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regula-
tions is a component of the agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”); Mullins Coal Co.
v. Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor, 484 U.S. 135, 159 (1987) (“In
the end, the Secretary’s view is not only eminently reasonable but also is strongly
supported by the fact that Labor wrote the regulation.”); Bruh v. Bessemer Venture
Partners III, 464 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2006).
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matter . . . and by its relative political accountability.”114  The court
went on, however, to suggest that “[a]gencies have an additional
advantage in interpreting their own regulations.”115  Invoking Martin
v. OSHA, the court suggested that, because the agency is responsible
for both promulgating the rule and resolving any ambiguity through
interpretation, “it is in a superior position ‘to reconstruct the purpose
of the regulations in question.’”116  Not only does this illustrate that
courts are still willing to rationalize Seminole Rock deference on
originalist grounds, it also suggests that the two rationales can be
invoked simultaneously and in a complimentary manner.
Perhaps then, it is best to think of the pragmatic and originalist
rationales not as alternative rationales for Seminole Rock deference, but
as two complimentary rationales that work together to fully represent
the advantages and detriments of deferring to an agency’s interpreta-
tion of its own regulation.  To be sure, the pragmatic rationale for
Seminole Rock deference is the “ascendant” theory explaining why
courts should defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a stat-
ute.117  Furthermore, because the pragmatic rationale has been more
thoroughly explored, courts in subsequent cases will have more prece-
dent to rely upon in their invocation of the pragmatic rationale.118
But as the above discussion suggests, it is not the only rationale that
courts invoke.119  Courts still use originalist arguments to justify Semi-
nole Rock deference.120  In some cases, a court will invoke both ratio-
nales together.121  And if courts are still keen to invoke the originalist
rationale as a reason why an agency’s interpretation is entitled to Semi-
nole Rock deference, then it follows that prescribed limits to Seminole
Rock deference should also account for the originalist rationale, even
if in a limited capacity.
Furthermore, the pragmatic and originalist rationales both com-
port with different views of interpretation.  Interpretation can mean
“the process of determining what something, [especially] the law or a
legal document, means.”122  This definition is more consistent with
114 Bruh, 464 F.3d at 207.
115 Id. at 208.
116 Id. (quoting Martin, 499 U.S. at 152).
117 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1457; see also Angstreich, supra note
107, at 93 (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s recent approach to Seminole Rock
deference is to justify deference on pragmatic grounds).
118 Compare supra note 98, with supra note 105.
119 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1457–58 (“The death of the original-
ist rationale should not be exaggerated . . . .”).
120 See supra note 113.
121 Bruh, 464 F.3d at 207–08.
122 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 377 (3d pocket ed. 2006)
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the pragmatic rationale for Seminole Rock deference because its
emphasis on process reflects the notion that agencies have certain
advantages that make them the superior entity for engaging in the
process of interpreting regulations.123  Interpretation can also mean
“the understanding one has about the meaning of something.”124
This definition of interpretation is more in line with the originalist
rationale for Seminole Rock deference, with its emphasis on the idea
that agencies have a “special insight” into an interpretation’s mean-
ing.125  If both rationales capture different meanings of interpreta-
tion, it is reasonable to infer that the two rationales are differently
suited for resolving different ambiguity problems a court faces.
Based on the discussion above, the pragmatic rationale should
remain the dominant rationale that courts employ to justify their def-
erence to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own regulation.
The preference within the courts to invoke pragmatic rationales for
Seminole Rock deference, especially in modern cases, suggests that plac-
ing the major emphasis on the pragmatic rather than the originalist
rationale will do less to disturb precedent.126  Additionally, the prag-
matic rationale’s robustness offers advantages in applicability because
courts are able to rely upon the comparatively more thorough reason-
ing employed by other courts in the past.  The stated advantages of
agencies as policymakers that comprise the pragmatic rationale—
expertise, efficiency, flexibility, and accountability—can be applied to
a broader range of regulatory ambiguities than the originalist ratio-
nale can.127  Within this framework, the originalist rationale can fur-
123 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1456–57
124 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 122, at 377.
125 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1454.
126 See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).  The
SmithKline Court noted the practice of showing deference “to an agency’s interpreta-
tion of its own ambiguous regulations undoubtedly has important advantages,” such
as avoiding conflict within the Circuits in judicial decisions involving the interpreta-
tions, and “impart[ing] . . . certainty and predictability to the administrative process.”
Id. at 2168 & n.17 (quoting Talk America, Inc v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co, 131 S. Ct. 2254,
2266 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  While the
Court declined to show deference for the interpretation, id. at 2168, the language is
suggestive of the fact that the Supreme Court’s current view on Seminole Rock defer-
ence is closer to the pragmatic rationale.
127 As Stephenson and Pogoriler suggested in their proposed limitations to Semi-
nole Rock deference, the primary ramification of the originalist rationale is that defer-
ence should be shown to interpretations that are issued roughly contemporaneously
with the interpreted regulation.  Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1455.  This
would lead to infrequent application by courts because the circumstances when a
court could properly show deference to the interpretation would only arise when the
rulemaking agency also had the foresight to issue a contemporaneous interpretation
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ther focus the court’s attention on which interpretations deserve
Seminole Rock deference—namely, those interpretations that reflect an
agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous regulation, rather than a dis-
guised effort to make substantive policy change.
III. INCORPORATING THE ORIGINALIST RATIONALE INTO THE
BOUNDARIES OF SEMINOLE ROCK’S DOMAIN
This Note will now analyze how the limits to Seminole Rock defer-
ence as proposed by Stephenson and Pogoriler are affected when the
originalist rationale is also invoked.  From this starting point, the Note
will examine how the incorporation of the originalist rationale into
the limits of Seminole Rock deference affects the doctrine in three dif-
ferent ways.  First, Section A will identify instances when the originalist
rationale supports the limits that Stephenson and Pogoriler propose
and, in some circumstances, strengthens the argument for incorporat-
ing those limits into Seminole Rock deference.128  Section B will identify
instances when the originalist rationale should not affect the limits
proposed by Stephenson and Pogoriler because of countervailing fac-
tors that outweigh the implications of the originalist rationale.129
Finally, Section C will advocate for an additional limitation that is pri-
marily rooted in the originalist rationale but was rejected by Stephen-
son and Pogoriler.130
A. Limitations Supported by the Originalist Rationale
The first limitation proposed by Stephenson and Pogoriler is to
restrict Seminole Rock deference where courts invoke an
“antiplaceholder” principle in cases where the agency “promulgat[es]
placeholder legislative rules that nominally go through notice and
comment, but do not resolve key questions . . . [and] does the actual
policymaking work by issuing interpretive rules that purport to inter-
pret the placeholder rule.”131  Antiplaceholder cases can take three
different forms.
First, courts are unwilling to show deference to an agency’s inter-
pretation of a regulation that is “so vague as to be meaningless.”132  In
of its own regulation.  On the other hand, Stephenson and Pogoriler’s Mead-like limi-
tation suggests that courts could properly apply Seminole Rock deference to any inter-
pretation issued as a part of formal proceedings. See id. at 1504.
128 See infra Section III.A.
129 See infra Section III.B.
130 See infra Section III.C.
131 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1467.
132 Id.
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one such case in the D.C. Circuit, the Department of Justice issued an
interpretation, through the publication of a technical manual, which
stated that “lines of sight” language from one of its regulations
required that individuals in wheelchair seating would also be able to
see over standing spectators in sports venues.133  On appeal, the own-
ers of the MCI Center challenged the district court’s conclusion that
the Department’s interpretation that required 78–88% of wheelchair
seating to have a line of sight over standing spectators for the venue’s
various configurations was binding upon the case.134  The appellants
further argued that this interpretation substantively changed the defi-
nition in the technical manual without having gone through the pro-
cedures of notice and comment rulemaking.135  The Paralyzed Veterans
court rejected this argument.  While noting that “it is quite difficult to
draw a line between substantive and interpretive rules,”136 the court
observed that the distinction will depend upon how close the agency’s
interpretation is to the language of the initial regulation.137  Thus,
“[i]f the statute or rule to be interpreted is itself very general . . . and
the ‘interpretation’ really provides all the guidance, then the latter
will more likely be a substantive regulation.”138  In Paralyzed Veterans,
the court held that this principle required affirming the Department’s
interpretation because “the government’s position is driven by the
actual meaning it ascribes to the phrase ‘lines of sight comparable’”
and concluded the interpretation was not “sufficiently distinct or addi-
tive” to be considered a new regulation instead of an interpretation of
the regulation at issue.139  Had the Paralyzed Veterans court found the
interpretation distinct or additive, it is likely it would have concluded
the technical manual was just serving as a placeholder.
A second instance when courts have invoked the antiplaceholder
principle is when the court determines that the regulation the agency
interpreted merely parrots the statutory language, and thus, the
agency is engaged in substantive policymaking through its interpreta-
tion.140  In Gonzalez v. Oregon,141 the Attorney General issued an inter-
pretive rule that the use of certain medicines employed by Oregon
133 Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 581–82 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
134 Id. at 582.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 587.
137 Id. at 588.
138 Id. (citing United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345, 348 (D.C. Cir 1989)).
139 Id.
140 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1467–68.
141 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
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doctors for assisted suicide was not considered use for a “legitimate
medical purpose.”142  The Supreme Court found that the language of
the regulation the Attorney General interpreted “d[id] little more
than restate the terms of the statute itself.”143  Noting the similarity
between the “legitimate medical purpose” language of the regulation,
21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a), and various portions of the Controlled Sub-
stance Act,144 the Supreme Court concluded that “[s]ince the regula-
tion gives no indication how to decide this issue, the Attorney
General’s effort to decide it now cannot be considered an interpreta-
tion of the regulation.”145  Instead, the Court analyzed whether the
interpretation was entitled to Chevron deference as a permissible con-
struction of the Controlled Substance Act, rather than as an interpre-
tation of 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a).146  This demonstrates that a
reviewing court will, when confronted with an interpretation of a reg-
ulation that merely “parrots” the language of the organic statute, treat
the interpretation of the regulation as an interpretation of a statute
and review the interpretation under either Chevron or Skidmore, as
applicable.147
The final instance of a court’s employment of the
antiplaceholder principle occurs when the court determines that the
interpretation could not be the product of interpretation, even
though the interpreted regulation is not “mush” or a parrot of the
organic statute.148  In Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, U.S.
Department of Labor v. Mangifest,149 an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
found August Mangifest to be “totally disabled” under 20 C.F.R.
142 Id. at 249.
143 Id. at 257.
144 Compare 21 § C.F.R. 1306.04(a) (2005) (“A prescription for a controlled sub-
stance to be effective must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual
practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice.”), with 21 U.S.C.
§ 812(b)(1)(B) (2006) (“current accepted medical use”), id. § 829(c) (“medical pur-
pose”), id. § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii) (“issued for a legitimate medical purpose”), and id.
§ 802(21) (“in the course of professional practice”).
145 Gonzalez, 546 U.S. at 257 (observing that the regulation in question either
repeats statutory language or summarizes other portions).
146 Id. at 258–69 (concluding that the Attorney General did not have authority to
promulgate the Interpretive Rule with the force of law and instead was only entitled
to Skidmore deference).
147 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1469.
148 Id. at 1468.  Stephenson and Pogoriler suggest that this instance is a “broader
variant” of the antiplaceholder principle. Id. It appears to function as a catch-all
application of the antiplaceholder principle when the interpretation is neither
“mush” nor parroting the enabling statute.
149 826 F.2d 1318 (3d Cir. 1987).
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§ 718.204150 based upon the medical reports of two of Mangifest’s
treating physicians.151  The Director of the Office of Workers’ Com-
pensation Programs appealed this decision, arguing that the two med-
ical reports Mangifest relied upon were not in substantial compliance
with 20 C.F.R. § 718.104.152  Because the reports were not in substan-
tial compliance, the Director argued the ALJ could not rely upon the
inadequate reports at all, “even to tip the scales of a decision that had
the support of complying evidence on both sides.”153  The Mangifest
court rejected this argument.  The court first noted that the Director’s
“severe” position was inconsistent with other portions of the Director’s
briefs, which merely argued that noncompliant reports could not be
used standing alone.154  Furthermore, it appeared as if the ALJ’s find-
ings were in compliance with the Director’s less severe interpretation
of the regulation.  These inconsistencies, the court concluded, pre-
cluded deference to the Director’s interpretation of how 20 C.F.R.
§ 718.104 and § 718.204 interacted.155
The pragmatic rationale for why courts should not defer to these
types of interpretations is evident.  In the cases where a court deter-
mines that the agency used the regulation as a placeholder—whether
because the agency promulgated mush156 or parroted the statutory
language157—or that the interpretive rule should not be shown defer-
ence because it does too much policymaking,158 the court acknowl-
edges that the agency declined to fully use its institutional advantages
in regulating in the first instance, electing instead to make policy
through its less procedurally rigorous interpretive avenues.  In doing
so, the agency undermined the benefits associated with additional
150 “[T]otal disability may nevertheless be found if a physician exercising reasoned
medical judgment, based on medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques, concludes that a miner’s respiratory or pulmonary condition prevents or
prevented the miner from engaging in employment . . . .”  20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c)(4)
(1987).
151 Mangifest, 826 F.2d at 1322–23.
152 Id. at 1322.  The regulation required the medical report to “include the
miner’s medical and employment history,” 20 C.F.R. § 718.104, and listed other
requirements, such as noting all symptoms of respiratory disease, heart disease, and
other pertinent findings not listed on the medical form provided by the Office. Id.
153 Mangifest, 826 F.2d at 1324.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 1325.
156 Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 584 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
157 Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006).
158 Mangifest, 826 F.2d at 1325.
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procedure.159  The problem, as Stephenson and Pogoriler noted, is
that these antiplaceholder limitations are more effective for resolving
clear cases than for close cases:
[T]he antiplaceholder principle—in all its forms—is extremely dif-
ficult to administer effectively.  This principle, at bottom, requires
judges both to assess how much interpretive or policymaking work is
being done by the legislative rule relative to the interpretive rule,
and to develop a normative standard for how much interpretive
work is too much.  Both of these tasks are extremely difficult and do
not lend themselves to easy-to-articulate doctrinal formulations.160
For example, in Plateau Mining Corp. v. Federal Mine Safety &
Health Review Commission,161 the Tenth Circuit noted that the phrase
“render harmless” from 30 U.S.C. § 863(z)(2)162 was omitted in 30
C.F.R. § 75.334(b)(1),163 and despite the near identical language,
“the differences . . . suggest the ‘expertise and experience’ of the
agency . . . .  The omission from the regulation of the ‘render harm-
less’ language appears to be in recognition of the impossibility of ren-
dering methane-air mixtures completely harmless.”164  Even though
the court concluded deference should be given to the interpreta-
tion,165 it could easily have concluded the opposite: that the regula-
tion merely parroted the statutory language.
In this situation, inclusion of the originalist rationale for Seminole
Rock deference can make the antiplaceholder principle more effective
in resolving closer cases.  As discussed above, the originalist rationale
relies on the notion that the agency’s role as both drafter and inter-
preter means that the agency has a “special insight” into the original
regulation’s meaning.166  Applying this rationale to the
antiplaceholder principle would allow a reviewing court to resolve
some of the closer cases when it is unclear whether an agency has
violated the limitation on placeholder legislative rules.  In such cir-
cumstances, a court should defer to the agency when it trusts that the
interpretation is an actual reflection of the agency’s “special insight”
into the regulation’s meaning.
Returning to Plateau Mining as an example, presume that the
court was on the fence about whether the interpreted regulation
159 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
160 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1469.
161 519 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2008).
162 30 U.S.C. § 863(z)(2) (2006).
163 30 C.F.R. § 75.334(b)(1) (2008).
164 Plateau Mining Corp., 519 F.3d at 1193.
165 Id.
166 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1454.
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served to clarify the statute or merely parroted the statutory language.
In that case, originalist arguments could be used to support the con-
clusion that the agency had in fact used its “expertise and experience”
in promulgating the regulation.167  For instance, the agency could
have argued that it wanted to lessen the statutory rigidity without
negating the imperative of the original statute of protecting miners,
and to that end, the agency omitted “render harmless” from the regu-
lation, yet interpreted the regulation as still requiring maintenance of
a functioning bleeder system168 in order to further the statutory pur-
pose.  The Plateau Mining court came to this conclusion on its own,169
but it is not hard to imagine that, in a regime where an agency knows
it will receive deference when it can show it used its “special insight” as
the drafter of the regulation, the agency would offer similar argu-
ments to show the regulation is the product of the agency’s insight
despite appearing to function as a placeholder.
B. Limitations Unaffected by the Originalist Rationale
Stephenson and Pogoriler proposed withholding Seminole Rock
deference when the application of the agency’s interpretation would
retroactively punish the regulated entity.170  Additionally, Stephenson
and Pogoriler proposed a limitation similar to United States v. Mead
Corp.171 for limiting Seminole Rock deference to “interpretations issued
after formal adjudications.”172  Like the antiplaceholder principle,
Stephenson and Pogoriler argued for adopting these limitations as a
way to address implications of unchecked Seminole Rock deference.
The retroactivity and Mead limitations, however, do not garner any
support from the originalist rationale for Seminole Rock deference.  For
167 Plateau Mining Corp., 519 F.3d at 1193.
168 Id.  A “bleeder system” is a ventilation system that dilutes the concentration of
methane in work areas of the mine. Id. at 1179.
169 See id. at 1192–93.
170 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1481.
171 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
172 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1489.  The central holding in Mead is
that an agency’s interpretation of a statute qualifies for deference “when it appears
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated
in the exercise of that authority.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.  The Mead Court recog-
nized that “express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemak-
ing or adjudication” were “a very good indicator” of congressional intent to delegate
authority to the agency. Id. at 229.  The implication is that interpretations following
certain types of agency action are presumptively entitled to Chevron deference.  By
analogy, Mead-like limitations to Seminole Rock deference would also restrict deference
to interpretations of regulations.
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the reasons discussed below, the retroactivity and Mead limitations
should be adopted in spite of the fact that the originalist rationale
does not support the adoption of these limitations.
The retroactivity limitation is familiar from the statutory context.
In SEC v. Chenery Corp.,173 the Supreme Court held that agencies have
the ability to choose to act through either rulemaking or adjudication
procedures.174  Rules are incapable of anticipating every possible issue
in advance, and certain issues are too specialized or varied to be
addressed in a general rule; thus, agencies “must retain power to deal
with the problems on a case-to-case basis if the administrative process
is to be effective.”175  When the choice to adjudicate creates a retroac-
tive effect, the Chenery Court held the retroactive application is subject
to a balancing test.176  Therefore, when confronted with retroactivity
involving the enforcement of a statutory interpretation, the reviewing
court will employ a balancing test on a case-by-case basis as opposed to
adopting a categorical prohibition against retroactive application of
interpretations.
In the regulatory context, some courts reject this balancing test
and instead prohibit the application of an interpretation when doing
so would impose sanctions upon a party without sufficient notice.177
For instance, in Satellite Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,178 the D.C. Circuit
refused to affirm the FCC’s decision to reject the application of Satel-
lite Broadcast Company (SBC) to operate a radio station.179  The gov-
erning regulations suggested that SBC’s application could be sent
either to Washington or Gettysburg depending upon which regulation
controlled.180  The FCC denied SBC’s application because, according
to the FCC, SBC applied to the wrong location.181  On appeal, the
court noted that the FCC’s interpretation should be deferred to if rea-
sonable, but also considered the problem from the perspective of
SBC: had the FCC interpreted its own regulations in the same way
SBC did, the court would also owe that interpretation deference.182
173 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
174 Id. at 202.
175 Id. at 202–03.
176 Id. at 203 (“[S]uch retroactivity must be balanced against the mischief of pro-
ducing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable princi-
ples.  If that mischief is greater than the ill effect of the retroactive application of a
new standard, it is not the type of retroactivity which is condemned by law.”).
177 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1479 n.121 (citing examples).
178 824 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
179 Id. at 1–2.
180 Id. at 2–3.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 3–4.
2013] an  agency’s  special  insight 935
The court concluded that the FCC’s interpretation should be
deferred to, but it could not be applied to SBC.183  To do otherwise
would turn administrative law into “Russian Roulette” where regulated
parties would be forced to guess at an interpretation’s meaning and
hope they chose correctly.184
The originalist rationale for Seminole Rock deference does not pro-
hibit applying enforcement retroactively to a regulated entity.  It does
not matter when the interpretation is issued relative to the enforce-
ment of the regulation; what matters is how soon the interpretation is
issued after the regulation is promulgated.185  For instance, suppose
an agency promulgates a rule at T1, a regulated entity can choose to
act or not act at T2, and the agency issues an interpretation at T3, a
point in time that occurs X days after T1.186  If courts only adhered to
the originalist rationale for Seminole Rock deference, and the regulated
entity acted at T2, the reviewing court would not withhold deference
because the interpretation was later issued at T3.  Because the primary
implication of the originalist rationale is that interpretations issued
contemporaneously to the regulation are entitled to more deference
than those issued non-contemporaneously, all that would matter to
the court is how small X is.187  This would be true whether the regu-
lated entity chose to act at T2 (thus creating a retroactivity problem)
or at some point in time after T3 where there would be no retroactivity
problem.
When reconciling the conflict between the originalist rationale
and potential limits to retroactive application of an interpretation, it is
important to remember the reasoning employed in cases such as Satel-
lite Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.  There, the court noted that due process
protections require an agency to provide sufficient notice to a regu-
lated entity before the entity can be subjected to a penalty.188  Indeed,
the right of an affected party to contest an adverse decision by an
agency is one of the first principles of administrative law.189  Such a
right is rooted in the Constitution, protected under two amend-
183 Id. at 4.
184 Id.
185 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1454–55.
186 This example is similar to one used by Stephenson and Pogoriler. See id. at
1486–87.
187 See id. at 1455.
188 Satellite Broad. Co., 824 F.2d at 3.
189 Londoner v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385–86 (1908) (“But where
the legislature of a State, instead of fixing the tax itself, commits to some subordinate
body the duty of determining whether, in what amount, and upon whom it shall be
levied, and of making its assessment and apportionment, due process of law requires
that at some stage of the proceedings before the tax becomes irrevocably fixed, the
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ments.190  The fact that an agency has special insight into the regula-
tion’s original meaning should not abridge these fundamental rights.
Additionally, the retroactivity limitation can be viewed as a protection
against separation of powers concerns, as applied to the regulated
party.  Recall that the consolidation of legislative, executive, and judi-
ciary power into one body was—and still is—viewed as a serious threat
to liberty.191  If an agency received Seminole Rock deference for a retro-
actively applied interpretation, not only would the agency be, in
effect, exercising all three governmental powers,192 it would be doing
so without notice to the regulated entity that such an exercise of
power was forthcoming.  By applying a retroactivity limitation, regu-
lated entities will be assured that, when the agency de facto exercises
all three types of power, courts will at least restrict agencies from
doing so retroactively.193  Because these constitutional protections
come from a higher source of law, the retroactivity limitation should
remain unaffected by the incorporation of the originalist rationale
into Seminole Rock deference.
Similar arguments can be made about incorporating Mead-like
limitations to Seminole Rock. Mead’s holding suggests that an agency
would only receive Chevron deference for an interpretation which fol-
lowed formal procedures, and an interpretation subject to less formal
procedures would receive deference under the less deferential Skid-
more standard.194  Much like an interpretation of a statute, an agency
can issue an interpretation of a regulation in a variety of procedural
taxpayer shall have an opportunity to be heard, of which he must have notice, either
personal, by publication, or by a law fixing the time and place of the hearing.”).
190 See Ga. Pac. Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 25 F.3d
999, 1005 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that vague statutes or regulations violate the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
191 See supra notes 38–47 and accompanying text.
192 The agency would be responsible for the draft of the regulation (legislative
power), its enforcement (executive power), and, by virtue of deferential judicial
review, its interpretation (judicial power).
193 See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1988) (describ-
ing the general disfavor for retroactive lawmaking in the administrative context); see
also The Supreme Court 2011 Term: Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 176, 365 (2012)
(“The potential for abuse inherent in combining legislative and adjudicative func-
tions is at its apogee in cases of retroactive application, in which the regulated entity
does not even have the opportunity to comment on or object to the new interpreta-
tion or to prospectively alter its conduct to avoid liability.”).
194 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (“To agree with the
Court of Appeals that Customs ruling letters do not fall within Chevron is not, how-
ever, to place them outside the pale of any deference whatever. Chevron did nothing
to eliminate Skidmore’s holding that an agency’s interpretation may merit some defer-
ence whatever its form, given the ‘specialized experience and broader investigations
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contexts.195  The interpretations may follow formal procedures like
rulemaking or adjudication,196 may follow interpretive rules such as
general statements of guidance,197 or may be in documents prepared
in advance of litigation.198  The interpretation may also come from
different sources, such as from the director of the agency or a lower-
level official within the agency.199  While a Mead analog has not
appeared yet, it seems reasonable to extend Mead’s logic to Seminole
Rock because of the similarities among the various procedures from
which statutory and regulatory interpretations may be issued.200
The originalist objection to the Mead-like limitation is similar to
the objections to the retroactivity limitation.  As Stephenson and
Pogoriler observe, “it should not matter whether the agency
announces its interpretation of the regulation in a formal order, in a
nonbinding interpretive rule, in a litigation brief, or in any other
form” under the originalist rationale.201  The APA loophole compo-
nent of the self-delegation problem would not be solved, however, if
this reasoning were applied to Stephenson and Pogoriler’s Mead-like
limitation.  If rejection of the Mead-like limitation to Seminole Rock def-
erence were accepted, agencies would be capable of exploiting the
APA loophole by promulgating ambiguous regulations which were
later clarified through interpretive rules.202  Such an approach would
do nothing to incentivize an agency to properly use its interpretive
power.203  Conversely, adopting Mead-like limitations, in conjunction
with adherence to the retroactivity limitation, would have the effect of
forcing agencies to choose between receiving Seminole Rock deference
and information’ available to the agency . . . .” (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 139 (1944))).
195 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1482.
196 Compare INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999), with Humanoids
Grp. v. Rogan, 375 F.3d 301, 305–06 (4th Cir. 2004).
197 Compare Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000), with Paralyzed
Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 581–82 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
198 Compare Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. at 209, with Fed. Express Corp. v.
Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 397 (2008).
199 Compare Mead, 533 U.S. at 233 (“Indeed, to claim that classifications have legal
force is to ignore the reality that 46 different Customs offices issue 10,000 to 15,000 of
them each year . . . .”), with United States v. Lachman, 387 F.3d 42, 54 (1st Cir. 2004)
(“The defendants now call our attention to post-trial affidavits that suggest Commerce
officials within the agency internally gave the term a contrary interpretation and affi-
davits as to statements made by Commerce officials at industry seminars also sug-
gesting a contrary interpretation.”).
200 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1482–83.
201 Id. at 1456.
202 Id. at 1486.
203 See supra notes 59–67 and accompanying text.
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after going through formal procedures, or preparing to defend the
merits of an interpretation promulgated under more informal
procedures.204
The originalist rationale does not comport with both the retroac-
tivity limitation and the Mead-like limitation to Seminole Rock defer-
ence.  On balance, however, the retroactivity and Mead-like limitations
should not be rejected.  If the purpose of imposing limits on Seminole
Rock deference is to incentivize the proper use of an agency’s interpre-
tive power instead of abusing it in order to self-delegate,205 then these
limitations proposed by Stephenson and Pogoriler accomplish just
that because they provide additional constraints to Seminole Rock defer-
ence.  The retroactivity limitation eliminates concerns about due pro-
cess.  The Mead-like limitation addresses the loophole contained
within the APA.  The originalist rationale misses the opportunity to
cure major defects to deferring to an agency’s reasonable interpreta-
tion of its own regulation by rejecting the retroactivity and Mead-like
limitations, because the rationale does not focus on the timing of
interpretation relative to the regulated entity’s action or on the form
of the interpretive process.  Because the originalist rationale is ill-
equipped to address the concerns that the retroactivity and Mead-like
limitations ameliorate, this rationale should not be given weight when
courts resolve problems associated with interpretations that have ret-
roactive effect or interpretations promulgated under less rigorous
procedural paths.
C. Adopting an Additional Originalist Limitation
to Seminole Rock Deference
  Stephenson and Pogoriler argued against the adoption of some type
of consistency limitation to Seminole Rock deference: an agency inter-
pretation only receives deference when the agency has consistently
interpreted the regulation over time.206  Like the limitations in Sec-
tion B of this Part, the originalist and pragmatic rationales for Seminole
Rock deference suggest opposite conclusions about a consistency limi-
tation.  Unlike Section B, however, this Section argues that the
originalist rationale provides sufficient justification for adopting a
consistency limitation to Seminole Rock deference because it is stronger
than the pragmatic argument against adopting such a limitation.
The argument against the adoption of a consistency limitation
receives some support from analogy to Chevron.  In Chevron, the
204 See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1487.
205 See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
206 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1474–78.
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Supreme Court explicitly said that “[a]n initial agency interpretation
is not instantly carved in stone.”207  In supporting this position, the
Chevron Court noted the importance of allowing a certain degree of
flexibility to the agency so that it may engage in informed policymak-
ing,208 focusing on the flexibility and technical expertise that agencies
offer as expositors of a source of law.209  The Supreme Court has said
in even stronger language that inconsistency within an agency’s inter-
pretation is not a reason to withhold deference.  In National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,210 the FCC, after
rulemaking proceedings, concluded that broadband internet cable
modem service is an “information service” and not a “telecommunica-
tions service” under the Communications Act.211  The Ninth Circuit
vacated the portion of the ruling that relied upon this new definition,
stating that prior precedent defined cable modem service as a tele-
communication service.212
The Supreme Court rejected this conclusion, stating that Chevron,
not court precedent, was the appropriate analytical framework for
resolving statutory ambiguity.213  The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on stare
decisis is only appropriate where a reviewing court finds “judicial pre-
cedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency’s
interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to
fill.”214  Thus, the Brand X Court subjected “judicial interpretations
contained in precedents to the same demanding Chevron step one
standard” as if the court were reviewing an agency’s initial interpreta-
tion of a statute.215 Brand X suggests that the inconsistency of the
FCC’s interpretation did not matter when considering the issue of def-
207 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863
(1984).
208 Id. at 863–64.
209 Cf. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1459–60 (listing the pragmatic
arguments for Seminole Rock deference that “are familiar from the Chevron context”).
210 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
211 Id. at 975, 978.  “ ‘[I]nformation service’ . . . is ‘the offering of a capability for
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or mak-
ing available information via telecommunications . . . .’” Id. at 977 (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 153(20) (2000)).  “ ‘Telecommunications service’ . . . is ‘the offering of telecommu-
nications for a fee directly to the public . . . regardless of the facilities used.’” Id.
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 153(46)).
212 Brand X Internet Servs. v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Port-
land’s construction of the Communications Act remains binding precedent within this
circuit, even in light of the FCC’s contrary interpretation of the statute.”).
213 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980.
214 Id. at 982–83.
215 Id. at 982.
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erence: at most, inconsistency could be a reason for finding the
agency’s action arbitrary and capricious if not adequately
explained.216
Both Chevron and Brand X emphasize the problem with withhold-
ing deference for inconsistent interpretations in the Seminole Rock con-
text.  The flexibility of the agency would be undermined if it were not
deferred to when it issued an interpretation inconsistent with a previ-
ous position.217  Stephenson and Pogoriler also argue that a consis-
tency limitation might serve to deprive deference when it should be
encouraged most: when an agency encounters a new problem and
needs to revise its prior interpretation based upon new circum-
stances.218  This shows how a consistency limitation undermines the
efficiency rationale for Seminole Rock deference.  An agency cannot
effectively use its perceived advantages as policymaker if it will not be
deferred to by a reviewing court.  Under a regime that exclusively
focuses on the pragmatic rationale for Seminole Rock deference, there
is no support for adopting a consistency limitation.
However, there is a body of case law that suggests that courts
invoke consistency as a factor when deciding whether to grant or with-
hold deference.  First, the importance of consistency is not settled
within the Chevron context.219  The Supreme Court has repeatedly
stated that inconsistent interpretations are “‘entitled to considerably
less deference’” than a view which has been consistently held by the
agency.220  This position, as Stephenson and Pogoriler observe, has
continued even after the Supreme Court’s holding in Brand X.221
Inconsistency is also cited as a reason to withhold deference in the
regulatory context because an agency view that is inconsistently held
may indicate that the interpretation is not the product of “the
agency’s fair and considered judgment.”222  In Advanta USA, Inc. v.
216 Id. at 980–81 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46–57 (1983)).
217 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1478 (“And, of course, giving less
deference to subsequent inconsistent interpretations may undermine some of the
pragmatic advantages associated with Seminole Rock, in particular the ability to respond
flexibly to new information and changing circumstances, as well as responsiveness to
the political preferences of current electoral majorities.”).
218 Id. at 1479.
219 Id. at 1474.
220 Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994) (citing INS v. Car-
doza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987)); accord Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines,
Inc., 501 U.S 680, 698 (1991); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,
212–13 (1988); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981).
221 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1474 & n.103.
222 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997).
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Chao,223 Advanta was fined for failing to comply with a regulatory
requirement of maintaining restroom facilities within a quarter mile
of where employees work.224  On appeal, Advanta argued that a “ter-
rain exception” allowed the company to place facilities at the points of
vehicular access.225  The Eighth Circuit held that the Department of
Labor’s assertion, which was contrary to a contemporaneous interpre-
tation issued by OSHA in 1987, was not entitled to deference.226  This
suggests that courts are still willing to use the consistency of an inter-
pretation in determining whether to defer to an interpretation. Gon-
zalez v. Oregon is especially illustrative of this point.  There, the
Supreme Court also used originalist reasoning in reaching its conclu-
sion that a lack of consistency was reason for withholding deference:
[I]f there is statutory authority to issue the Interpretive Rule it
comes from the 1984 amendments to the [Controlled Substance
Act] that gave the Attorney General authority to register and dere-
gister physicians based on the public interest.  The regulation was
enacted before those amendments, so the Interpretive Rule cannot
be justified as indicative of some intent the Attorney General had in
1971.  That the current interpretation runs counter to the intent at the time
of the regulation’s promulgation, is an additional reason why [Seminole
Rock] deference is unwarranted.227
If the fact that the regulation parroted the statutory language was
a sufficient ground for withholding deference, it seems unlikely that
the Supreme Court would then go on to indicate that the Attorney
General’s inconsistency in interpretation also precluded deference.
Gonzalez’s originalist, consistency-based approach thus served as an
additional, and perhaps necessary, reason for withholding Seminole
Rock deference.
Thus, this Note advocates for the adoption of a weaker version of
the consistency limitation.228  Under this proposed test, a reviewing
court would defer to an agency’s consistent interpretation, while only
applying the less deferential Skidmore standard to inconsistent inter-
223 350 F.3d 726 (8th Cir. 2003).
224 Id. at 728.
225 Id. at 729.
226 Id. at 730–31 (“We can find no evidence the DOL has consistently interpreted
the Standard to require seasonal seed corn operations to place facilities in the middle
of cornfields.  The DOL’s delinquent assertion of such a position further diminishes
any deference.”).
227 Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257–58 (2006) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
228 Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1475.
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pretations.229  Adopting such a position appears to be the best way to
reconcile the contradictory manner in which courts treat consistency.
While it is true that the Supreme Court rejected consistency as a factor
for granting deference in Brand X, it did state that inconsistency, if
unexplained, would be arbitrary and capricious.230  This suggests that
the Supreme Court did not consider consistency important when an
agency issued a new interpretation after the agency followed more for-
mal rulemaking procedures.  In Brand X, the FCC issued a new inter-
pretation after rulemaking.231  Consistency might not be as important
if the agency has gone through notice and comment rulemaking, but
what about interpretive rules that are not subject to the same procedu-
ral safeguards?232
In this way, a consistency limitation works especially well when
paired with the Mead-like limitations.  A court facing an interpretation
similar to Brand X would grant deference not because the interpreta-
tion was consistent, but because the interpretation followed formal
procedures.  On the other side of the coin, adopting a weak version of
the consistency principle would allow courts to show deference to
those interpretations that are opposite of the one at issue in Brand X:
interpretations issued in an interpretive rule, in a general statement,
or in some otherwise informal procedure, but that are nonetheless
positions consistent with how the agency has interpreted the underly-
ing regulations in the past.  Such a position would be easily adminis-
trable because the court would know whether to apply the Mead-like
or the consistency limitation based on the procedures used in the pro-
mulgation of the interpretation.  If the interpretation was promul-
gated under a formal procedure or notice and comment rulemaking,
the court would apply the Mead-like limitation.233  If the interpreta-
tion was promulgated under a less formal procedure, then the court
may conclude that the interpretation is nonetheless entitled to defer-
ence if it is a consistently held view of the agency.234
Furthermore, there is normative appeal to the consistency limita-
tion because the limitation encourages predictability.  Predictability
within the law is highly desirable in both administrative law and other
229 Id. For a discussion on the Skidmore standard, see supra note 50.
230 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981
(2005).  For a discussion of arbitrary and capricious review, see supra note 56.
231 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 977–78.
232 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2006).
233 See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 1, at 1481–90.
234 See supra notes 219–27 and accompanying text (observing that courts are will-
ing to consider consistency as a factor when determining whether the interpretation
should be shown deference).
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contexts.  Consistency is one of the factors that a court considers when
deciding whether to grant an interpretation Skidmore deference.235
The requirement that an agency’s final rule be a “logical outgrowth”
from its proposed rule protects regulated entities from being blind-
sided by the final rule without constraining the agency’s flexibility too
greatly.236  A desire for consistency can also be found in the Four-
teenth Amendment: “No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws.”237  In civil procedure, a defendant’s minimum con-
tacts with a forum state make it predictable that the state can exercise
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, thus preventing a person
from becoming a party to surprise litigation in an unexpected
forum.238  Professor Fuller even argued that predictability and consis-
tency are part of the moral justification for a legal system.239  With the
adoption of a consistency limitation, regulated entities could order
their affairs based upon current agency interpretations with more
confidence and without fear that the a court will defer to a new,
inconsistent interpretation that was not promulgated through formal
procedures in which the entities have a voice.  In this way, the consis-
tency limitation functions similarly to the retroactivity limitation: both
provide regulated entities with affair-ordering confidence that an
agency will not “spring a trap” upon them when least expected.240
235 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
236 See, e.g., Conn. Light & Power Co., v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(quoting Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1978)) (noting
that the agency “need not renotice” regulated entities except for major changes to the
proposed rule).
237 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The Equal Protection Clause embodies the
norm of consistency because it requires the government to treat its citizens consist-
ently across certain suspect classifications, such as race. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1967) (holding that a law prohibiting interracial marriages was
“arbitrary and invidious discrimination” that had “no legitimate overriding purpose”
to justify the classification).
238 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (“‘[T]he foresee-
ability that is critical to due process analysis . . . is that the defendant’s conduct and
connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there.’” (alteration in original) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980))).
239 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969) (arguing that “intro-
ducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by
them” fails one of the eight inner moralities of the law); see also id. at 79–81 (articulat-
ing how constancy through time and protections against retroactive legislation both
protect against a similar harm of legislative inconstancy).
240 Compare supra notes 188–93 and accompanying text, with supra notes 228–34
and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
  This Note has further explored the proper limits to Seminole Rock.
Agencies play an increasingly central role in our modern government
because of their ability to resolve ambiguity in a way that other govern-
mental actors cannot, whether compared to the much slower process
of legislation or to the less technically experienced judiciary.241  Yet
for all the advantages of granting deference to an agency’s reasonable
interpretation of its own regulation, there are problems that preclude
an expansive application of the doctrine.  The doctrine itself may rest
on shaky constitutional ground.242  Additionally, unlimited Seminole
Rock deference incentivizes an agency to abuse the doctrine through
use of a loophole contained within the APA.243  Limitations to Semi-
nole Rock deference can help to mitigate these problems and incen-
tivize the agency to properly engage in interpretation where
appropriate.
The pragmatic rationale of Seminole Rock deference is a sound
starting point.  Stephenson and Pogoriler prescribe a number of lim-
its, rooted in the similarities between Seminole Rock deference and
Chevron deference, which address problems with unchecked Seminole
Rock deference.  A limit prohibiting placeholder regulations, which
can be interpreted later, prevents agencies from abusing the APA
loophole and encourages agencies to use their rulemaking or adjudi-
cative capabilities to announce new substantive policy.244  The retroac-
tivity limitation affords due process to regulated entities, mitigating
some of the constitutional concerns of consolidating rulemaking and
interpretation within the same branch of government.245 Mead-like
limitations have a similar effect, granting only Skidmore respect to
interpretations announced through informal procedures.246
Yet a discussion of the pragmatic rationale alone does not
describe how courts justify Seminole Rock deference.  While Chevron
and Seminole Rock may be similar to the extent that they both involve
an agency resolving ambiguity in a source of law, Seminole Rock has the
added twist that the entity responsible for interpreting the source of
law is also the entity responsible for drafting it.247  This creates unique
241 See supra notes 71–80 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 38–47 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
244 Compare supra Section III.A, with supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
245 Compare supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text, with supra notes 43–47
and accompanying text.
246 Compare supra notes 195–204 and accompanying text, with supra notes 55–62
and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 102–09 and accompanying text.
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problems for Seminole Rock deference that must be addressed through
the imposition of limits to the doctrine.  But it is also a benefit that the
agency might have special insight into the original meaning of the
regulation.248  That benefit should be kept in mind when delineating
the limits to the deference that a reviewing court should show.  While
it may not be the primary rationale that courts invoke to support
granting deference, the originalist rationale is still useful in prescrib-
ing limitations on Seminole Rock.  It justifies deference in close
antiplaceholder cases where the agency can show it used its special
insight to determine the ambiguous regulation’s meaning through
interpretation and has not engaged in interstitial policymaking absent
the proper procedural safeguards, notwithstanding the appearance of
“mush” or parroting of the organic statute.249  Furthermore, it sug-
gests that deference is appropriate for consistent interpretations that
may not otherwise be given deference, such as consistent interpreta-
tions issued through less formal procedures.250  The consistency limi-
tation, if accepted by courts, could provide another route to
deference for agencies, thereby encouraging the proper use of agency
interpretive power while restricting the possibility of self-delegation.
248 See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text.
249 See supra notes 156–69 and accompanying text.
250 See supra Section III.C.
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